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Abstract. This paper investigates a specific type of information that
should have an important place in the epistemic state of individual
agents, namely their experiences. Just as beliefs, desires, or intentions,
experiences should be properly represented, and their specific role in rea-
soning and decision processes clearly identified. After formally defining
what an experience is, the paper explains in what respect experiences
differ from and complement beliefs, and are not just ordinary cases. The
added value of experiences in agent reasoning and decision making is
then discussed in detail.
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1 Introduction
The idea of experience is central in different human activities such as scientific
inquiry, learning processes for education, or even in the understanding of art,
as well as the role of shared experience in communication. While it has received
some attention in human sciences [10,11,2,16,20], its specificity has not been
entirely recognized in artificial intelligence. Certainly, the idea of experience as
being the result of the accumulation of cases of interest is at work in case-based
reasoning [1], and some authors, e.g. [3,17,9,18,19], have used the word ‘experi-
ence’ for referring to valuable cases (then stored in memory). But then, a set of
experiences, viewed as a repertory of cases, is not considered as an original com-
ponent of agents’ epistemic states that interacts with generic beliefs, and which
should be handled specifically, together with beliefs, in reasoning and in decision
making tasks. It is this latter view that we shall advocate in the following. It
indeed contrasts with case-based reasoning, since cases are then the only kind of
information that is considered. Moreover, an ordinary case is not usually enough
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to constitute an experience, as explained in the following.
According to Dewey [10], there is experience each time an agent performs
an action and associates consequences to it. This author also emphasized that
neither an action alone nor a consequence alone does make an experience. This
leads us to the following informal definition: An experience is an action per-
formed by an agent x who perceives consequences of that action. An experience
can also be made from watching another agent who performs an action. Agent
x may also evaluate (positively or negatively) the perceived consequences of the
action. For instance, in a case like “Mary experienced a traffic jam when going
to airport last Saturday morning, got angry and missed her flight”, the action is
“experiencing a traffic jam”, the retained consequences are “getting angry” and
“missing a flight”, and the evaluation is (implicitly) negative here.
Thus, an experience has two main features that distinguish it from ordi-
nary actions. Indeed, at least some of its consequences: i) are unexpected for
the agent, and ii) emotionally significant for the agent. Then, the experience is
worth being kept in mind by the agent. Strictly speaking, the surprise created by
the unexpected consequence of the experience is part of the emotion, which also
includes other components that make the consequence relevant for the agent.
Thus, while the agent is emotionally affected by the experience, the experience
is associated with some consequences that are unexpected with respect to the
agent’s beliefs. In the following we concentrate on this latter aspect. As such, an
experience constitutes a piece of knowledge which differs from generic beliefs.
In the following, after having introduced the representation setting used in
the paper in Section 2, we formally define the notion of experience, and show
how it interacts with the notion of belief in Section 3. We then discuss the
added values of experiences in reasoning and decision making in Section 4, before
indicating lines for further research in the conclusion.
2 Logical language
We assume a logic (L, CN) where L is a set of all well-formed formulas, CN is a
consequence operator, that is a function from 2L to 2L. Indeed, for X ⊆ L, CN(X)
returns all the consequences (under CN) that follow from X. We do not require
here any particular property from CN (beyond the assumption that CN(CN(X)) =
CN(X)). A notion of consistency is associated with the logic (L, CN):
Definition 1 A set X ⊆ L is consistent in logic (L, CN) iff CN(X) 6= L. X is
inconsistent otherwise.
Regarding the logical language, we assume that it contains two kinds of
formulas (L = F ∪ G with F ∩ G = ∅):
i) F ⊆ L which represent factual beliefs about what is true in the environ-
ment. For instance, ‘My laptop is heavy’ is a factual belief since it concerns a
particular instance.
ii) G ⊆ L contains the generic beliefs about the (default) laws that hold in
the environment. An example of generic beliefs is ‘The first generation laptops
are heavy’. Unlike the previous example, it concerns a class of laptops and not
one particular instance.
Moreover, we shall use a list of atoms V that do not appear in L, and which
play the role of names. Finally, we let Ags denote a set of agents.
Action is a key notion in the formulation of experience. Indeed, as we shall
see in the next section, an experience amounts to performing an action and ob-
serving and evaluating its consequences. An action has a name (e.g., “going to
the USA”), it has a set of pre-conditions that should be fulfilled before perform-
ing the action, and a set of post-conditions which represent the consequences of
the action. Finally, an action is always performed by one or more agents.
Definition 2 An action is a tuple a = (N,P,C,A) such that: i) N ∈ V is
the name of the action; ii) P ⊆ F are the pre-conditions of applicability of the
action; iii) C ⊆ F are the consequences of the action; and iv) A ⊆ Ags is the
set of agents who perform the action.
It is worth mentioning that the same action name may be associated with
different pre-conditions and/or with different post-conditions. Let us consider
the action “going to the USA”. From one year to another, the visa requirement
may change and thus, the pre-conditions are not the same. Similarly, for the
same action, the consequences may change.
3 The notion of experience
In this section, we focus on one particular agent ag ∈ Ags who is equipped with
a consistent knowledge base Σ ⊆ L. An experience of this agent (called actor
of the experience) is an action performed by the agent itself. The consequences
attached to this action are also assigned and evaluated (positively or negatively)
by this agent. Thus, the agent establishes a causality relation between the action
and its consequences. Note that in contrast with the use of action in planning,
the consequences are not given a priori (as part of the definition of the action),
but identified by the actor. In some sense, experiences might feed the libraries
of actions that we start with when planning.
An experience is personal to the actor, since the same action made by two
different agents may not manifest the same consequences for both. Although
an agent may report some of their own experiences to another agent, the ex-
perience reported does not in general become an experience of the latter agent.
Moreover, what makes an action a genuine experience for an agent is the fact
that it emotionally affects the actor positively or negatively, and its consequences
are not expected by the actor (the agent either expects exactly the contrary of
the perceived consequences, or the agent had no particular expectations a priori).
Thus for instance, our weekly shoppings are certainly not experiences. As-
suming that amounts to say that there is nothing peculiar or different from a
normal visit. However, if one meets the president in the supermarket, then shop-
ping gives birth to an experience since it is unexpected to see the president there.
Besides, experiences can both be made in the past or envisaged in the future.
All these remarks lead us to the following definition.
Definition 3 An experience is a pair e = (y, z) such that:
– y is an action (N,P,C,A) such that:
a) A = {ag};
b) P ⊆ CN(Σ) ∩ F ;
c) C ⊆ F s.t. C 6⊆ CN(Σ).
– z = eval(C) s.t. eval : 2F → S where S is a scale.
If C = ∅, then e is a future experience. Otherwise, it is a past one.
It should be emphasized that the action may be a simple observation (e.g.,
looking at a sunset), or a physical action (e.g., going to a restaurant). So, you
hearing somebody who calls you an idiot counts as an experience. Moreover,
the preconditions of the action may be misrepresented or misunderstood by the
actor. For example, Peter thought he did not need a business visa for China.
Similarly, the consequences may be wrongly associated to the action. For in-
stance, one may wrongly think that a train is delayed because of the snow whilst
in reality the train in question has some engine problem. What matters here is
perceived causality [6]. The perceived consequences may also be a strict subset
of the real consequences.
Note that the condition C 6⊆ CN(Σ) captures the idea that consequences are
unexpected for the actor. The idea is that at least some consequences in C do
not follow from the knowledge base of the agent. This covers two cases:
– either ∃c ∈ C such that ¬c ∈ CN(Σ)
– or ∃c ∈ C, c 6∈ CN(Σ) and ¬c 6∈ CN(Σ).
This means that the generic beliefs of the agent were not enough to fore-
cast all the consequences of the action in the circumstances were the action
took place. In the last of the two above cases, C is consistent with CN(Σ), but
not deducible from CN(Σ). In the first case, the consequences obtained are in
contradiction with what was expected. In both cases, the experience brings a
supplementary piece of knowledge w.r.t. the generic knowledge, and in case of
contradiction with what was expected, the agent learns that some (new) excep-
tion do exist with respect to its generic beliefs.
Thus, past experiences are not just ordinary reported cases. They have been
singled out for their unexpected consequences that did not leave the agent feel-
ing indifferent when it perceived them. As a consequence, the epistemic state of
an agent facing a current situation about which it is trying to draw conclusions,
is made of three parts, i) the factual beliefs about the current situation, ii) the
generic beliefs applicable to this situation, and iii) the experienced cases that
supplement this generic knowledge. Note that the experienced cases if they are
sufficiently repeated may give rise to new pieces of generic beliefs, or may lead to
revise these beliefs. However, experienced cases, as such, are not generic beliefs,
and should be handled in a specific manner.
As just said, experiences supplement generic knowledge, but we have to dis-
tinguish between two quite different cases: i) the consistency case, and ii) the
abnormality case. In both cases, the epistemic state of the agent will be repre-
sented by a pair of subsets of possible worlds, say K and E, where K is supposed
to account for the worlds that are not impossible according to the agent’s generic
knowledge (and the factual beliefs about the current situation), or if we prefer
the set of interpretations that are consistent with this knowledge, while E gath-
ers the worlds that are guaranteed to be possible in the sense that they have
been already encountered by the agent in past experiences.
In the consistency case, we have E ⊆ K. This corresponds to a situation
of bipolar information [5], where one can distinguish between a positive part of
the information, here represented by E, which represents what is possible for
sure (because it was experienced), and a negative part of the information which
corresponds to all the possible worlds that are ruled out for sure (due to beliefs),
namely here Ω \ K, where Ω denotes the set of all the possible worlds. More
generally, K and E may be replaced by a pair of possibility distributions with
intermediary grades of possibility [5].
At this step of the discussion, we will view K and E as binary possibility
distributions, i.e., ω ∈ K (resp. ω 6∈ K) means that ω is not impossible (resp.
impossible), while ω ∈ E means that ω is possible for sure since it was experi-
enced. But ω 6∈ E does not mean at all that ω is impossible, but just that it has
not been experienced yet. As can be seen, the “classical” knowledge represen-
tation situation corresponds to the case K = E, where no distinction is made
between what is “not impossible” and what is “possible for sure”. Making such
a distinction is important for acknowledging the specific nature of experiences
with respect to generic knowledge, since agents tend to favor the former when
reasoning and making decisions.
The abnormality case is more tricky, since then E ∩ (Ω \K) 6= ∅, i.e. there is
some consequence associated with some experience that is in contradiction with
the agent’s generic knowledge. As long as the generic knowledge is not revised
(in order to recover the consistency condition between E and K), the only way
to handle this inconsistency is to consider that in fact K represents the set of all
the possible worlds that are normally possible, while there exist some abnormal
(exceptional) worlds outside K. This is similar to nonmonotonic reasoning where
one has to reason under incomplete factual knowledge with rules having potential
exceptions. Here some exceptions factually exist since they were experienced.
4 Reasoning with and about experiences
Different forms of reasoning may involve experiences. In particular, one may
reason about experiences for making a kind of compilation of a set of experiences.
One may also reason about a factual situation on the basis of a set of generic
beliefs and of a set of experiences. One may also wonder how to take advantages
of both beliefs and experiences in a decision, or in an argumentation process.
We briefly examine these three classes of problems.
4.1 Percolation of experiences
There are two situations where it makes sense to aggregate elementary experi-
ences into a compound experience.
The first one is when the agent performs the same action in very similar
circumstances, and perceives the same consequences, then the description of
circumstances may be minimally enlarged to cover all the slightly different cir-
cumstances of the elementary experiences. This includes the case of getting rid of
details that are finally found irrelevant for the description of the experience. For
instance, an agent gets sick each time after eating a particular dish in different
restaurants, and finally retains as a “global” experience that eating this dish she
gets sick, without no longer associating any particular restaurant to this state
of facts.
The second case occurs when the same action that is repeated in the same
circumstances has led to differently perceived consequences. This does not mean
that there is any inconsistency: experiences never contradict each other, they
just accumulate. Still it is important to keep track of the variability of the con-
sequences by taking as a new consequence the disjunction of the consequences
of the elementary experiences. Such situation is encountered in case-based rea-
soning, where, e.g., two second hand cars that are quite similar in all respects
may have been sold to significantly different prices.
Generally speaking, it is a distinctive feature of positive information to be
accumulated disjunctively : the fact that a possible world ω is possible for sure
because it is observed does not prevent that another world ω′ to be also possible
for sure because it is observed later. This contrasts with negative information,
which corresponds to the classical view of logical knowledge bases, where the
more pieces of the information the agent has, the more restricted the set of
worlds remaining possible is (since they are not impossible), as a result of the
conjunctive combination of these pieces of information.
4.2 Reasoning from experiences and beliefs
Let us first observe that from beliefs on may infer new beliefs, and even from
generic beliefs, one may infer new pieces of generic belief, see, e.g., [4,13], but
from experiences, or from experiences and beliefs, one does not infer experiences.
So, reasoning from experiences and beliefs makes only sense when applying them
to a factual situation under consideration.
Generally speaking, when reasoning about a factual situation s, experiences
may either complement or challenge beliefs, as already explained. They com-
plement beliefs when the conclusions obtained from beliefs that apply to s are
imprecise or even amount to complete ignorance. However, s may appear in the
preconditions of some past experiences. Then, one may take advantage of the
consequences of those experiences in order to draw plausible conclusions about s.
Still the problem of reasoning with both beliefs and cases, which requires a
bipolar setting, has received little attention up to very few exceptions [21]. For
illustrating the issue, let us consider the following example which corresponds to
a simple situation where both beliefs and experiences bring some valuable and
consistent information.
Example. We have two pieces of generic beliefs (coming from general regu-
lations), namely the two following rules:
– “if an employee is in category 1, his monthly salary (in euros) is necessarily
in the interval [1000, 2000]”,
– “if an employee is in category 2, his monthly salary (in euros) is necessarily
in the interval [1500, 2500]”.
Suppose we also know by experience that
– “an employee in category 1 has a monthly salary typically in the interval
[1500,1800]”,
– “an employee in category 2 has a monthly salary typically in the interval
[1700, 2000]”.
Strictly speaking, all the values in [1500,1800] or in [1700, 2000] have not been
observed for employees of categories 1 and 2 respectively, but one may con-
sider that these intervals are the convex hulls of set of values that have been
experienced for such employees. Then suppose we have the imprecise piece of
factual information that “Peter is in category 1 or 2”. What can be concluded
about Peter’s salary? Using the two generic rules we get that his salary is in
[1000, 2000] ∪ [1500, 2500] = [1000, 2500]. Indeed, from “if p1 then q1”, “if p2
then q2”, “p1 or p2”, one concludes “q1 or q2” (or if prefer in propositional logic
terms ¬p1 ∨ q1,¬p2 ∨ q2, p1 ∨ p2 ` q1 ∨ q2).
Besides, the values in [1500, 1800] ∩ [1700, 2000] = [1700, 1800] are for sure
possible for Peter’s salary. The use of the intersection ∩ here may be justified
intuitively by the fact that the more imprecise the situation, the smaller the
associated set of values that are possible for sure. Indeed, it is only those values
that are common to the two contexts ‘category 1’ and ‘category 2’ that can be
retained as values that are possible for sure in the imprecise context ‘category
1 or category 2’. A formal logical mechanism that can handle inferences with
positive information can be found in [5]; see [14] for the case of fuzzy rules (i.e.,
with graded possibility distributions).
When an experience leads to consequences that are not consistent with the
conclusions obtained from beliefs about s, we have to give priority to experiences
over beliefs (at least if there is no uncertainty on the consequences associated
with experiences). This also means that we need a case-based reasoning mecha-
nisms working together with a non-monotonic mechanism for handling the de-
fault rules expressing generic beliefs. Something that has still to be done.
Besides, the fact that agents possess both beliefs and experiences should
also considerably enrich argumentation, since experiences may provide a natural
basis for counter-argumention, by offering counter-examples to generic rules that
have been used in a previous argument for supporting a conclusion, which then
becomes challenged.
4.3 Making decision from experiences and beliefs
Decision under uncertainty takes advantage of the available knowledge (possibly
pervaded with uncertainty) about what can be deduced about the state of the
world in the current situation, and of how good or bad are the consequences
of actions performed in precisely known states of the world. Then, depending
on what are the rationality postulates, different decision criteria, such as, for
example, the expected utility, can be justified ; see, e.g. [7].
In contrast with such approaches, Gilboa and Schmeidler have already ad-
vocated the need for making decisions on the basis of experiences, called cases
in [15]. Indeed, it is common in everyday life that people make decisions on the
basis of their own experiences, or maybe those of others. In [15], they propose a
formal model for case-based decision making, and justify the use of a similarity-
based decision criterion. It is worth noting that in their model, beliefs are not
involved at all. However, it seems clear that the application of generic beliefs to
the current situation for determining the possible states of the world where the
action will take place, should enrich the case-based decision process. Thus, it
suggests the need for a new decision model which satisfactorily combines beliefs
and experiences.
A formal parallel between decision under uncertainty and case-based deci-
sion has been already made for pessimistic and optimistic qualitative decision
criteria [12]. Intuitively speaking, in decision under uncertainty, according to
the pessimistic criterion, a good decision in an ill-known situation, is a decision
that in any precise state compatible with the ill-known situation leads to a good
consequence, while in case-based decision, the pessimistic criterion privileges the
decisions (if any) that in all cases similar to the current situation have led to a
good consequence according to past experiences. The optimistic criteria in de-
cision under uncertainty (resp. in case-based decision) considers that a decision
is good as soon as there exists at least one state compatible with the ill-known
situation that leads to a good consequence (resp. at least one case similar to the
current situation where the decision has led to a good consequence according to
past experience).
Such decision criteria could be adapted when we have both generic beliefs
and experiences about candidate decisions. Consider the pessimistic point of
view, in the case where experiences are consistent with beliefs (i.e., E ⊆ K in
the notations of Section 3). Then asking for having all cases similar to the cur-
rent situation leading to a good consequence is less requiring than asking that
all non impossible states compatible with the ill-known situation lead to a good
consequence. Note that with the optimistic point of view, this is the converse:
it is more requiring to have at least one case similar to the current situation
leading to a good consequence rather than having one state compatible with the
ill-known situation that leads to a good consequence (since the set of worlds
similar to E remains strictly included in K).
When some experiences contradict generic beliefs (i.e. in the abnormality case
of Section 3), then the agent has to assume that the generic knowledge covers
normal situations only, and that some abnormal cases may be encountered as
well by experience. Then a more difficult situation is when all normal situations
lead to good consequences for a candidate decision, while it has been observed
that this decision in some abnormal cases led to bad consequences. If the agent
is moderately pessimistic, it may be already satisfied if in all normal states com-
patible with the ill-known situation, the decision leads to a good consequence,
even if some (but not all) experiences where the decision was experimented led
to bad consequences. But, if the agent is very pessimistic, the agent will be afraid
to make a choice that once led to a bad consequence, even it was abnormal. This
suggests the need for designing sophisticated decision criteria able to cover all
these situations.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a first manifesto in favor of a forgotten component in
the modeling of the epistemic states of an agent in Artificial Intelligence: the
experiences held by the agent. Indeed, we believe that experiences are a compo-
nent which is fundamentally different from beliefs, desires and intentions, and
which deserves to be formalized and clearly distinguished from the others. We
have explained in detail why beliefs and experiences are not of the same nature,
and we have indicated in general terms how they may impact both reasoning
and decision making in general. This should lead to a new generation of agent
architecture, that we may call XBDI agents (where X stands for experience),
which enlarges the original BDI architecture [8]. Then, the addition of this com-
ponent raises many basic issues, such that how to compute intentions on the
basis of beliefs, experiences, and desires.
The new architecture will make it possible to define platforms that allow
several agents to share experiences. For instance, one may imagine an application
in which agents bring their past experiences to others about a particular topic.
We can also think of another type of application in which a group of agents want
to have a joint future experience such as visiting a place of interest together, for
instance. In this case, the future experience is a common desire for the agents.
Both these examples are only possible if the notion of experience for agents is
clearly defined.
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